Abstract: Unlike individuals and corporations, countries indebted beyond their ability to pay cannot use bankruptcy laws to restructure unsustainable debt. The United Nations and the International Monetary Fund have attempted to propose treaties to enable that debt restructuring, but the political difficulties of reaching a worldwide consensus have stymied their efforts. This article argues that a modellaw approach to restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt should be feasible and effective because the vast majority of sovereign debt contracts are governed by the laws of either the debtor-state or two other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions individually could enact a model law to give struggling nations a real prospect of equitably restructuring their debt to sustainable levels. By enabling such debt restructuring, that enactment would also help to foster the norms required to facilitate the development of international treaties.
a debt restructuring plan that requires all of a debtor-state's debt issues to agree to the plan. 13 To attempt to address that final reason for CAC insufficiency, the International Capital Market Association ("ICMA") in August 2014 proposed revised and updated forms of CACs, which would aggregate voting across debt issues.
14 These forms of aggregate-voting CACs will have the same limitations as other CACs, most notably binding only creditors who are parties to agreements that include them. 15 Even if all new sovereign debt contracts were to include aggregate-voting CACs, it will be many years before existing debt contracts, which do not include them, are paid off. 16 CACs therefore been a step forward in some ways, but they are not a substitute for pursuing a more systematic legal resolution framework 17 for helping debtor-states to restructure unsustainable debt.
18 Such a framework would reduce the social costs of sovereign debt crises. 19 It would also reduce the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are costly and create moral hazard, and would reduce creditor uncertainty. Furthermore, it would reduce the risk of systemic contagion from a debtor-state's default. This article argues that a model-law approach to achieving that resolution framework should be legally, politically, and economically feasible.
Section 2 of the article explains the concept of a model law and its utility in cross-jurisdictional lawmaking. It also distinguishes model laws from conventions (or treaties), the other basic form of statutory approach to cross-jurisdictional lawmaking.
Section 3 of the article discusses the history of statutory approaches to sovereign debt restructuring. It also describes current initiatives that follow a statutory approach, explaining why they are unlikely to be feasible at this time. Finally, it explains why a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring should be more feasible than those initiatives. Notably, a model-law approach would not require general acceptance for its implementation. Because most sovereign debt contracts (if not governed by the debtor-state's law) are governed by New York or English law, it would be sufficient if England and New York State -and it would be valuable if merely one of those jurisdictions -enact a model law.
Section 4 of the article analyzes how a sovereign debt restructuring model law should be structured. To that end, it proposes a form of a model law and discusses its provisions. The discussion explains, among other things, what a model law should cover, what it should not cover, and why.
Section 5 assesses the legal feasibility of a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring. Because the article implicitly addresses legal feasibility throughout, this Section focuses on two critical questions of first impression. Because a model law would have to operate retroactively in order to bind a debtorstate's numerous existing creditors, this Section first analyzes the validity of such retroactivity. Thereafter, this Section analyzes the ability of a model law to overcome the veto power of pari passu clauses, which have stymied the effectiveness of existing sovereign debt restructurings efforts. 20 Finally, Section 6 shows that a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring should be economically and political feasible, as well as more feasible than alternative statutory approaches. Unlike a convention, for example, a model-law approach would not require general acceptance for its implementation. A modellaw approach should also have cost advantages over the status quo, both to debtor-states and to their creditors.
Model Law or Convention?
There are two basic forms of statutory approaches to cross-jurisdictional lawmaking 21 -a model law, and a convention (or treaty). A model law is suggested legislation for national (and sometimes subnational 22 ) governments to consider enacting as domestic law in their jurisdictions. 23 Each government enacting a model law should therefore take the steps necessary to make the law effective in its jurisdiction.
To facilitate cross-jurisdictional (sometimes called cross-border) legal comparability, each government enacting a model law should, ideally, enact the same legislative text. For that reason, model laws are sometimes called uniform laws. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 24 exemplifies in an international context, and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the US exemplifies in a subnational context, model laws that have been uniformly enacted.
A convention is an agreement or compact among nations and is synonymous with a treaty. 25 Under a convention, each member state would be bound to adhere to the convention's requirements without requiring further action by its legislative body.
The most obvious advantage of a convention over a model law is that conventions are binding upon contracting states and may only be modified or denounced by a treaty amendment. 26 In contrast, model laws may be amended or denounced unilaterally by a nation without violating international law. 27 This more binding (2001) ( arguing that the all-or-nothing nature of a convention is superior to a model law because a model law may be materially distorted by an enacting jurisdiction).
feature provides parties greater certainty that treaty-bound nations will follow through on their commitments, and not renege as political winds shift. 28 Nations sometimes see that greater certainty as a disadvantage, especially if they are experimenting with new proposals. 29 Experimentation requires flexibility, so the more relaxed nature of a model-law approach may then be more appealing. 30 For this reason, and also because the less formal process of developing and enacting a model law can promote open communication, a modellaw approach can sometimes be more productive than a more formal treaty approach. 31 Indeed, adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, an area of law that had for many years struggled to realize reform, may have been successful, in part, due to its less formal structure as a model law. 
Statutory Precedents
This Section begins by examining the history of statutory approaches to sovereign debt restructuring. Thereafter, it describes the current initiatives that follow a statutory approach and explains why a model-law approach should be more feasible than those initiatives.
History
The earliest discussion of a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring appears to have taken place at the 1933 Pan American Conference in Montevideo. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 563, 570-571 (1996) (noting that it was structured as a model law because "a treaty would be a greater accomplishment, but much more difficult"); Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 30 (suggesting that the model law structure is a possible explanation for the sudden and surprising reform in the area of multinational bankruptcy Such an approach was also proposed, in 1942, in the initial US draft for the charter of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") . 34 That draft prohibited IMF member nations from defaulting "without the approval of the Fund." 35 It also empowered the IMF to engage in "compulsory arbitration" of sovereign debt settlements.
36
The rationale for this strong IMF control was that "objective decisions on defaults [cannot] be made by the defaulting country or by the country gaining most by continued servicing of a debt…. Consideration of the pros and cons of a contemplated default by the fund would seem to promise" objectivity because the IMF represents the interests of a wide range of member nations.
37
The first recent call for a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring came from Jeffrey Sachs, then an economist at Harvard (and now at Columbia). In an unpublished paper, he argued that although almost all sovereign debt restructuring involves the IMF, there is a "lack of standards vis-à-vis" the IMF's role as an international lender of last resort. 38 As a result, " [t] he structure of IMF-led debt restructurings has been woefully inadequate," especially when compared to corporate bankruptcy debt restructurings.
39
I and others then followed Jeffrey's challenge. In 2000, for example, I published the first comprehensive analysis of what such a statutory mechanism should look like.
40 I attempted to offer a legal theory of sovereign debt restructuring by examining how the conceptual basis of bankruptcy reorganization law could be adapted to sovereign debt restructuring.
41 I began that analysis by analyzing which axioms should apply to sovereign debt restructuring.
42 I then applied those axioms to derive a normative framework for regulation. 43 Thereafter, I proposed a simple set of rules for an international convention which included, most notably, supermajority aggregate voting and priority claims for financiers 34 Ibid. 35 J. Keith Horsefield, The White Plan, in III The International Monetary Fund 1945 -1965 Ideas, 1976 -2001 401, 402 (2003) (arguing that the SDRM had perception problems and was self-serving); Westbrook, supra note 6, at 256 (arguing against the SDRM's designation of the IMF as the supervisory entity).
Current Initiatives
Nonetheless, scholars have been continuing to advocate a statutory mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring, emphasizing the limitations of the contractual approach. One such mechanism, proposed by Christoph Paulus and Ignacio Tirado, suggests the advent of "resolvency" proceedings. 53 Resolvency courts, similar to the Sovereign Debt Tribunals advanced in the SDRM, would help to facilitate creditor-debtor negotiations.
54 Debtor-states would be able to submit restructuring plans to be considered and approved (via majority or supermajority voting) by each class of creditors. 55 The proceedings would also allow for the participation of prospective lenders, to help debtor-states obtain financing during the debt restructuring process.
56 I also have argued that contractual approaches alone cannot solve the central problems in sovereign debt restructuring, 57 and have proposed a model international convention that has similarities to the SDRM but differs in certain important details.
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In 2014, the United Nations General Assembly voted to begin work on a statutory approach, referred to as a "multilateral legal framework," for sovereign debt restructuring. The resolution -originally promoted by Argentina, apparently in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to let stand a lower court ruling enforcing pari passu clauses in Argentine sovereign debt -was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the Group of 77 developing nations (of which Bolivia was then the chair) and China. 59 The US again, 60 and apparently the European Union also, 61 opposes this approach. 62 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been tasked with moving this approach forward. There is skepticism, however, whether any formal framework, such as a convention, is feasible -at least in the near future -without U.S. and E.U. support.
A Model-Law Initiative
A model-law approach should be more feasible than a convention or treaty because it would not require general acceptance for its implementation. The prototype of a model law could be developed by nations, institutions, 63 or individuals. Nations and even subnational jurisdictions, such as New York State, 64 could individually enact a model law as their domestic law. That could help "to develop consensus around ideas that are commercially sound and legally effective."
65
A model law could also be pursued in parallel as part of an overall strategy for developing a legal resolution framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
66
Notably, a model-law approach could sidestep the U.S. and E.U. opposition to a convention that is evident in the United Nations. 67 For example, to the extent not governed by the debtor-state's law, most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law. 68 One or both of those jurisdictions -in the case of New York law, a subnational jurisdiction 69 -could enact legislation based on a model law. Thus, unlike the UCC, the initial goal for a sovereign-debtrestructuring model law would be enactment by just one or two jurisdictions.
61 Italy, speaking on behalf of the EU, stated that the IMF is the "primary forum to discuss sovereign debt restructuring." Ibid. 62 None of the developed economy countries supported the resolution, although many abstained rather than vote no. See Recorded Vote at 37th meeting, Dec. 5, 2014, Rev. 973, 1016 Rev. 973, (1983 (observing that legislatures would want newly enacted bankruptcy legislation to be retroactive, in order to effectively reduce financial chaos by applying to all debts). 74 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 9, at 1012-1013 [citing sources including 1 Oppenheim's International Law 918-921 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)]. The issue of legal risk is related to retroactivity. Legal risk refers to the risk that substantive provisions of a jurisdiction's law change after an agreement is signed incorporating that jurisdiction's law as its governing law. Legal risk is an inevitable risk in international agreements. See, e.g. Wood, supra note 68, at 15 (observing that "[i]t is not possible by contract to stablise the law, e.g. that the governing law is that at the time of the contract. The fluctuating governing law must still be ascertained and will apply to this term of the contract. A change in the governing law will override.").
Nothing under English law further restricts a law's retroactivity.
75 U.S. constitutional law could, however, restrict the retroactivity of New York law. This article nonetheless concludes that it should not restrict the retroactivity of New York law based on the model law.
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Next consider how a model law should be structured.
Structuring a Model Law
To analyze how a model law for sovereign debt restructuring should be structured, the Appendix sets forth a proposed form of a model law (the "Model Law"). 
Rationale
The preamble explains the reasons for the Model Law. The ultimate goals are to restore the debtor-state to debt sustainability, so as to relieve the undue economic burden on the debtor-state's citizens; to enable the debtor-state to pay its debts, thereby avoiding a default that might have systemic consequences; to reduce creditor uncertainty, which increases lending costs; and to reduce the need for costly debt bailouts, which create moral hazard. 
Claims Covered
Article 2(2) broadly defines the types of debt claims that the Model Law covers. Notably, its coverage is not limited to bond debt or other debt instruments traded as securities. The Model Law covers all payment claims against a debtor-state for monies borrowed or for the debtor-state's guarantee of (or other contingent obligation on) monies borrowed.
Unlike the IMF's SDRM, which covered only long-term-maturity claims (of the types of claims it otherwise covered), the Model Law does not discriminate between, and thus covers both, long-term and short-term maturities. This recognizes that, increasingly, most sovereign debt "bailouts have come in response to the [rollover] of short-term claims." 77 Covering this important cause of a debtor-state's inability to pay will help to facilitate necessary debt relief while also reducing short-termlender moral hazard; short-term lenders can no longer assume that their claims against a financially troubled debtor-state will be paid in full. That, in turn, will reduce rollover risk -in this context, the risk that a debtor-state will be unable to borrow sufficient new funds to repay maturing short-term debt. 78 The head of the sovereign debt restructuring practice at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP has called rollover risk one of today's most critical sovereign debt problems.
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Article 2(2) also broadly defines "monies borrowed" to include a wide range of financing, other than trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary course of business. The Model Law's coverage does not discriminate based on the nationality of the holders of the (otherwise) covered claims or the currency in which such claims are payable.
80 Consistent with the historical norms of most sovereign debt More generally, the very issue of the need for a supervisory authority can raise confusion. Formal sovereign debt restructuring solutions, such as a convention, are often conflated with the need for formal supervisory bodies. 84 Under the Model Law, however, no formal supervisory authority is needed to exercise discretion because disputes are adjudicated through binding arbitration. 85 The main role of a Supervisory Authority under the Model Law is in fact ministerial: to fact-check information and to oversee the creditor voting process.
86 81 E-mail from Ignacio Tirado, Professor, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, and advisor to the World Bank, to the author (March 23, 2014 Simple, Stupid) and Other Guiding Principles, 37 Mich. J. Int'l L. __ (forthcoming 2016). The Supervisory Authority might also consist of a rotating panel of III or CIGI members whose fees and expenses would be paid for by the debtor-state invoking application of the Model Law. 83 Prof. Westbrook argues, for example, that one of the SDRM's flaws is that the IMF, the supervisor thereunder, would be conflicted, having responsibility for both funding and administering the proceeding as well as addressing rights and priorities. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 256. Cf. Joseph E. , A Rule of Law for Sovereign Debt, available at http://www. project-syndicate.org/commentary/sovereign-debt-restructuring-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-and-martinguzman-2015-06 (arguing that the IMF "is too closely affiliated with creditors" to be neutral). 84 That might in part help to explain U.S. and E.U. opposition to U.N. efforts to reach a formal sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. international consensus emerges on the operative legal solutions needed to solve the holdout and funding problems, the institutional bodies needed for supervision and resolution will naturally follow.
Debt Sustainability
Article 3(2) 
The Holdout Problem
Article 7 of the Model Law addresses the most critical problem that a debt-restructuring mechanism can solve -the holdout problem. 93 A Model Law or other statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring should be more effective in solving the holdout problem than a contractual approach. 94 Article 7(2), for example, legally mandates supermajority voting that (assuming the requisite percentages agree) can bind dissenting classes of claims. This eliminates the need for the 93 Cf. supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the holdout problem as a type of collective action problem). It should be emphasized that the Model Law preserves the holdout threat to the extent needed to motivate debtor-states to bargain fairly, and only seeks to limit that threat for rent-seeking holdouts who try to unreasonably extract value. See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text. 94 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 9, at 1003. contracts themselves to include CACs. 95 Article 7(3) of the Model Law, coupled with Article 6(1), also enables a debtor-state to use the Model Law to aggregate creditor voting beyond individual contracts. Aggregate-voting is critical for at least two reasons: it can prevent creditors of individual sovereign debt contracts from acting as holdouts vis-a-vis other sovereign debt contracts; 96 and it allows a debtor-state to designate large enough classes of claims to prevent vulture funds (or similar holdouts), as a practical matter, from purchasing enough claims to block a restructuring plan or otherwise control the voting.
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In contrast, the Greek sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated that the CAC approach is insufficient to solve the holdout problem. Even after years of trying to include them, relatively few Greek debt agreements actually contained CACs, and those CACs were generally restricted to bond issues. 98 Furthermore, most of the CACs that were included in those debt agreements did not contemplate aggregatevoting and thus did not purport to bind creditors to supermajority voting beyond the individual debt issue; that enabled any given debt issue to serve as a holdout vis-a-vis other Greek debt issues. 99 In contrast, statutory supermajority aggregate voting is the tried-and-true method by which corporate insolvency law successfully, and equitably, addresses the holdout problem. 
Interim Funding
Chapter IV of the Model Law addresses the critical need for a financially troubled debtor-state to obtain liquidity during its restructuring process. Although this funding 95 Although Article 7(2) proposes supermajority percentages that have been used successfully in U.S. bankruptcy law [see 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)], other supermajority percentages could be substituted. It should be cautioned, however, that the higher the percentages, the easier it would be (other things being equal) for a vulture fund to buy a blocking position. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Cf. infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing how the Model Law's aggregate-voting can also help to prevent that). L. 895, 941 (1996) (noting that supermajority voting "protects the minority" and that the "tremendous growth in the size of the corporation as well as the number of shareholders probably extinguished any thought of returning to the unanimity rules … given the obvious potential for holdout rent seeking").
has in the past often been provided by the IMF, the "IMF's lending policy … is not enough to resolve the problems posed by debt burdens beyond the country's ability to pay."
101 Absent the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority, no one would lend new money without obtaining a priority repayment claim. A contractual solution would be insufficient; it would be totally impractical to get all existing creditors to contractually subordinate their claims to the new money.
102 But a statutory mechanism can give such new-money lenders priority over existing creditors. 103 To minimize the risk of "overinvestment," existing creditors should have notice and the opportunity to block the new lending if its amount is too high or its terms are inappropriate.
104 Articles 8(2) and 8(3) of the Model Law, respectively, provide that notice and opportunity.
Recently, the IMF has been considering more flexible options in funding sovereign nations "in the context of sovereign debt vulnerabilities."
105 When a troubled member nation seeks financing above its normal IMF-access limits, the IMF will have to decide whether that nation's problems can be resolved with or without a debt restructuring. Under its current policy, "if the [IMF] determines that the member's debt is sustainable with high probability, it may provide large scale financing without the need for a debt restructuring. However, if such a determination cannot be made, exceptional access may only be provided if a debt restructuring is pursued that is sufficiently deep to restore sustainability with high probability."
106
The IMF is also exploring whether it should have a broader range of responses. For example, if a member nation is unable to obtain private-sector funding but its debt is considered (albeit not with high probability) sustainable without the need for a debt restructuring, the IMF is considering providing debt relief by extending the maturities of its own debt claims against that nation.
107 In my view, that would 101 , supra note 5, at 2. effectively constitute a unilateral debt restructuring -the IMF itself providing a form of debt relief without seeking a quid pro quo from the member nation. Chapter IV of the Model Law also contemplates the possibility of a debtorstate financing its debt restructuring through the capital markets. Consistent with best practices in corporate bankruptcy cases, a debtor-state contemplating invoking application of the Model Law could pre-negotiate that financing in advance. Nothing in the Model Law prevents a debtor-state from also, or alternatively, obtaining such financing through a governmental or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.
Arbitration of Disputes
The neutral international arbitration body referenced in Article 10(2) of the Model Law might include a newly created entity designed to arbitrate sovereign debtrelated disputes, such as the free-standing "Sovereign Debt Tribunal" proposed by Paulus and Kargman. 108 Even absent a statutory framework, the resort by sovereign-debt-restructuring parties to such a tribunal could be contractual. For example, such parties could agree -ex ante (via contractual agreement in their underlying loan documents) or ex post (by mutual agreement after the dispute has arisen) -to arbitrate sovereign debt-related disputes before the tribunal.
Stay of Enforcement Actions
The Model Law also omits certain provisions that one might otherwise associate with a legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring. For several reasons, it does not propose a stay of enforcement actions. First, a stay does not appear to be critical to resolving sovereign debt problems. A debtor-state could unilaterally decide to suspend payments. And the main purpose of a stay, to prevent a grab race, is less significant in a sovereign debt context because creditors could only attempt to grab the State's relatively few assets located in other jurisdictions. 109 Second, model laws are less likely than conventions to effectively impose enforce-108 See Paulus and Kargman, supra note 90, at 3. 109 See Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 9, at 984-985. See also Setser, supra note 48, at 5 (observing that "[e]ffective legal action by creditors against a sovereign in default is extremely difficult") and at 12 (observing that "neither debtor nor creditor lawyers thought the absence of a formal stay was much of a problem") (emphasis in original). But cf. Eichengreen, supra note 86, at 444 (arguing that a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring should include hard restraints on litigation). ment stays. If a creditor's claim against a debtor-state is governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has enacted the Model Law, such creditor would theoretically be prejudiced in a grab race by other creditors of that state whose claims are governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has not enacted the Model Law. That creates perverse incentives for creditors to want to have their claims governed by the law of a jurisdiction that has not enacted the Model Law. Third, a stay could be costly, leading to litigation over its scope and duration and also possibly affecting nonbankruptcy incentives, thereby increasing sovereign financing costs. 
Cram Down
The Model Law also omits a cram-down alternative in the event one or more classes of claims fails to agree. Although Article 7(1) makes a debt-restructuring plan effective and binding on the debtor-state and its creditors when it has been submitted by the debtor-state and agreed to by each class of such creditors' claims designated in the plan, any such class of claims could stymie the plan's effectiveness by failing to agree. To overcome the possibility of one or more classes of claims unreasonably withholding consent to a plan, corporate debt-restructuring laws often provide for a cram-down power.
Cram down has also been applied in at least one governmental debt restructuring context: the application of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to municipal debt restructuring. In that context, a municipal debtor can cram down -or force acceptance of a debt-restructuring plan -over the objection of one or more dissenting classes of creditors if, under the plan, the creditors are "receiving all they can reasonably expect to receive under the circumstances." 111 The application of cram down under Chapter 9 has focused on whether the municipality has 110 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 9, at 984-985. 111 More specifically, Chapter 9 allows a court to confirm a proposed municipal bankruptcy plan, despite creditor objection, if the plan is "in the best interests of the creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) ("The court shall confirm the plan if . . . the plan is in the best interests of the creditors."). In making this determination, Chapter 9 incorporates the cram-down concept of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which requires the court to confirm a proposed reorganization plan that is, inter alia, "fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims," despite the objection of creditors. § 901(a); §1129(b)(1); see also imposed reasonable austerity measures and has made reasonable use of taxation, so that the plan's treatment of the dissenting classes is fair and equitable.
112
The difficulties with applying cram down in a governmental debt restructuring context are in determining what governmental austerity measures and levels of taxation are reasonable, in order to assess whether the creditors are receiving all they can reasonably expect under the circumstances. 113 At the very least, these determinations would be complex, fact-intensive, and highly politically sensitive. 114 In the Chapter 9 context, federal bankruptcy courts make these determinations, yet the decisions are far from consistent. 115 In the sovereign Cal. 1999) , the court held that raising taxes is unnecessary if it would be futile, and a municipality cannot be required to do so. By contrast, a plan has been held to not be fair and equitable where a small increase in tax revenue is possible and sufficient to satisfy creditors. In Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., 144 F.2d 563, 565-566 (9th Cir. 1990 ), the appellate court rejected the determination that the plan was fair and equitable and overturned the lower court's confirmation because there debtor-state context, however, there is as yet no suitable judicial venue for making such determinations. Furthermore, the "are creditors receiving all they can reasonably expect under the circumstances" standard is much vaguer in a sovereign debtor-state context than for domestic U.S. municipalities. In the US, there are generally accepted norms about the range of what constitutes reasonable taxation. Also, the potential flight of residents to other municipalities -which is much less feasible in a sovereign nation context -sets pragmatic limits on taxation.
For these reasons, and also because including cram down at this nascent point in the model-law process could engender significant creditor opposition, 
Creditors' Committee
Finally, the Model Law does not provide for the formal creation of a creditors' committee, to officially represent the debtor-state's creditors in the debt restructuring. An official creditors' committee does not appear to be necessary in a sovereign-debt-restructuring context because "the claims against a State are so large that many creditors, or at least a de facto committee of creditors chosen consensually, should find it economically feasible to participate in the restructuring process."
118 Some have even argued that an official creditors' committee was not a sufficient showing that the municipality's taxing powers were inadequate to generate the revenue needed to pay the dissenting creditors. But, if an increase in tax revenues would make matters worse for the municipality than the plan the may be confirmed. 120 Creating such a community, he contends, should promote inter-creditor fairness because all of those creditors -whether domestic or foreign, private or governmental -are affected by the debtor-state's financial condition.
121
Next consider the legal feasibility of the Model Law.
Legal Feasibility of a Model Law
This article implicitly throughout has addressed the legal feasibility of a modellaw approach to sovereign debt restructuring. To the extent debtor-states enact the Model Law, there should be no general feasibility concerns.
122 For example, the Model Law's principal operative provisions -supermajority aggregate voting, and the granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-state's debt restructuringshould not be discriminatory or arbitrary.
123
The article next focuses, however, on two specific legal feasibility questions of first impression raised by the Model Law: the validity of its retroactively, 124 which is needed to bind a debtor-state's numerous existing creditors; and its ability to overcome the veto power of pari passu clauses, which have stymied the effectiveness of existing sovereign debt restructurings efforts -especially the ongoing Argentine debt-restructuring efforts.
119 , supra note 5, at 3. 120 Paulus, supra note 52, at 402. 121 Ibid. at 402-403. 122 Certain other concerns about the effectiveness of model laws may be flawed. For example, some have argued that "[n]ational legislation cannot resolve conflicts arising when bonds have been issued in different jurisdictions. , supra note 5, at 4. The Model Law, however, could resolve conflicts for all bonds governed by the law of a jurisdiction that enacts it. 123 Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51 Duke L. J. 1179 , 1227 -1228 (2002 . Cf. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 9, at 1012-1014 (analyzing those same types of retroactive provisions under international law and concluding that none of the provisions on "super-majority voting, discharge, and the granting of priority to financiers of the State's debt restructuring … discriminates based on the nationality of the bondholders … [or] is arbitrary because all are essential to a debtor-state's ability to restructure its debt"). 124 See Model Law Article 1(2).
Retroactivity
Legal retroactivity is respected under international law so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. 125 Recall, however, that the Model Law's retroactivity could raise an enforceability concern under domestic subnational law. 126 In particular, the issue is whether U.S. constitutional law would restrict the retroactivity of New York law based on the Model Law.
The "Contracts Clause" in Art. I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states (as opposed to the federal government) from enacting any legislation that impairs existing contractual obligations. 127 Nonetheless, New York State should be able to frame its enactment of the Model Law in such a way as to not violate the Contracts Clause.
The Contracts Clause does not extinguish a state's ability to exercise its police powers to promote or protect the public commonwealth, including protecting economic activity within its borders. 128 The U.S. Supreme Court generally defers to state economic regulation, especially during times of "emergency." 129 A state statute that substantially alters preexisting contractual obligations does not automatically violate the federal Contracts Clause.
130
The Supreme Court has articulated five factors that a court should consider when determining if a state statute violates the Contracts Clause.
131 Such a statute would survive a Contracts Clause challenge if it (1) addresses a grave temporary emergency, (2) protects a "basic societal interest, not a favored group," (3) provides relief that is appropriately tailored to the emergency it is enacted to address, (4) imposes reasonable conditions, and (5) is limited to the duration of the emergency. 132 More recent jurisprudence suggests even more leeway, enabling a state law to retroactively impair contracts if the impairment is reasonably necessary to further an important public purpose and also reasonable and appropriate to effectuate that purpose.
133 This leeway may be even greater if the contractual impairment is not substantial.
134 Moreover, the party asserting a Contracts Clause violation appears to have the burden of proving the violation.
135
New York State therefore should be able to frame its enactment of the Model Law in such a way as to not violate the Contracts Clause. Such enactment would represent an exercise of New York's police powers to reduce a sovereign debt default that could lead to a systemic economic collapse, thereby protecting economic activity within its borders. Furthermore, the Model Law would (1) address a grave temporary economic emergency, (2) protect a "basic societal interest, not a favored group," (3) provide relief -in the form of supermajority aggregate voting for debt relief and temporary funding -that is appropriately tailored to the emergency it is enacted to address, (4) impose reasonable conditions, and (5) be limited in its application to the duration of the economic emergency. It therefore should meet the U.S. Supreme Court's criteria to survive a Contracts Clause challenge.
136
The Model Law's retroactive effect should be enforceable also because any contractual impairment should not be "substantial,"
137 being limited to changes that are voluntarily agreed to by a supermajority of pari passu creditors based on the debtor-state's deteriorating economic circumstances. Thus, the changes -and hence the contractual impairment -should reflect the economic reality of 132 Ibid. 133 Healthnow N.Y. Inc. v. New York State Ins. Dept., 110 A.D. 3d 1216 , 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2013 . This case, however, is a state court decision. 134 Ibid. See also Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) . Cf. Allied Structural Steel Co., supra note 128, at 244 (holding a state law invalid under the Contracts Clause because, despite the states' police power, "that power has limits when its exercise effects substantial modifications of private contracts"). what those creditors expect (under those changed circumstances) to receive as payment. As a result, their "reasonable expectations under the contract" should not be disrupted.
138

Pari Passu Clauses
Recall that pari passu clauses currently in sovereign debt contracts are undermining Argentina's ongoing debt restructuring efforts.
139 These clauses effectively require that all payments to creditors under a given debt contract be made pari passu to all of that contract's creditors. 140 Say, for example, that a particular debt contract with Country X has three creditors -Creditor A with a claim of $1000, Creditor B with a claim of 2000, and Creditor C with a claim of $3000. If Country X makes a $1000 payment on this debt, that payment must be shared equally and ratably (i.e. on a pari passu basis) among the three creditors. Thus, Creditor A would have the right to receive its ratable share ($1000/$6000, or onesixth), Creditor B would have the right to receive its ratable share ($2000/$6000, or one-third), and Creditor C would have the right to receive its ratable share ($3000/$6000, or one-half), of that $1000 payment.
Recent U.S. federal court decisions have required that pari passu sharing of payment even when certain creditors of an original debt contract, which has a pari passu clause, exchanged their original claims for debt claims under a new debt contract. 141 This has enabled holdouts under the original debt contract to Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006 ) ("To assess whether an impairment is substantial," a court should "look at 'the extent to which reasonable expectations under the contract have been disrupted'.") [quoting Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir 1997) ]. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State 'Bankruptcy', 59 UCLA Law Review 322, 336-337 (Dec. 2011) , also available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1807944. A holdout creditor might argue that its reasonable expectations under the contract are to act as a holdout, and those expectations are substantially impaired. Any such holdout expectations, however, are not to be repaid money from the debtor-state per se; rather, they are to extract value from the other creditors. Sovereign debt contracts generally do not -or at least, do not intentionally -grant creditors holdout expectations. prevent Argentina from paying holders of the exchanged debt claims unless the holdouts are paid equally and ratably.
See
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In response, ICMA has proposed a new form of standard pari passu clause for sovereign debt instruments. 143 This new form clarifies that although claims against the debtor-state rank pari passu in principle, they need not be paid on an equal and ratable basis with other such debt claims -even if such other debt claims arose under the same contract:
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET ASSOCIATION STANDARD PARI PASSU PROVISION FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES GOVERNED BY NEW YORK LAW
The Bonds constitute and will constitute direct, general, unconditional and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer for which the full faith and credit of the Issuer is pledged. The Bonds rank and will rank without any preference among themselves and equally with all other unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer. It is understood that this provision shall not be construed so as to require the Issuer to make payments under the Bonds ratably with payments being made under any other External Indebtedness.
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There are problems with ICMA's approach. Most significantly, its new form of pari passu clause will only apply to future debt contracts, and then only to such future debt contracts that explicitly incorporate that new form. pdf. ICMA has proposed a similar standard form of pari passu clause, slightly modified without relevance for this article's discussion, for sovereign debt instruments governed by English law. 145 International Monetary Fund, supra note 16, at 32-34 (observing that the IMF needs to " encourage the introduction of the modified pari passu clause … using a three-pronged approach [,]" and "[e] ven if the Fund is successful in promoting the inclusion of the proposed contractual provisions in new international sovereign bond issuances, this will not affect the existing stock[,]" whose extent of "undermin[ing] the debt restructuring process will depend, in large part, on how courts interpret pari passu clauses in future litigation [,] " and this "existing uncertainty regarding the existing stock" is unlikely to "be addressed in the immediate future by promoting the accelerated turn-over of this debt").
Law's supermajority aggregate voting, their principal amounts would, as so modified, legally change. Because the restructuring is intended to restore the debtorstate to debt sustainability, it thereafter should be able to pay all of those changed debt claims.
Next consider whether the Model Law would be economically and politically feasible.
Political Economy of a Model Law
Economic Feasibility
The economic feasibility of the Model Law will turn on its costs and benefits, both to debtor-states and to their creditors. Certainly a nation whose debt has been restructured should be able to borrow at attractive rates. In the non-sovereign context, by analogy, lending rates to restructured companies are much lower than rates charged before the restructuring.
146 But would a model-law approach increase a nation's ex ante borrowing costs by making creditor claims more subject to bail-in?
Leading economists have recently argued to the contrary -that uncertainty due to the absence of an effective sovereign debt resolution framework "increases the costs of borrowing."
147 However, even if such a framework would increase costs, overall sovereign borrowing rates should not be affected any more than if -as most agree would be desirable -workable collective action aggregate-voting clauses were in fact included in all sovereign debt contracts. In fact, recent empirical analysis suggests that the inclusion of those clauses does not increase, and may even decrease, sovereign borrowing rates.
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Furthermore, the possibility that a model-law approach might increase a nation's ex ante borrowing costs should be viewed in a larger context. Any such cost increase should be offset by the cost saving that would result from a model law. By analogy to corporate bankruptcy, few economists would suggest that 146 Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options, supra note 17, at 110-111. This is because creditor support through participation, combined with operational restructuring that often accompanies debt restructuring, is viewed favorably by the market. The lower rates also reflect firms' lower debt-to-equity ratios. Similarly, a debtor-state should have a lower debt-to-GDP ratio and thus should be less likely to default in the future. Ibid. 147 , supra note 5, at 1. corporate bankruptcy law should be repealed because it might increase the borrowing cost of solvent companies.
The economic feasibility of a model-law approach should also take into account its costs and benefits to creditors. Reduced uncertainty has already been mentioned as a potential benefit.
149 A potential cost, however, is that the Model Law would facilitate the transfer of value from creditors to a debtor-state if a class of claims agrees to a restructuring that reduces its principal amount or interest rate. That transfer of value nonetheless would be bargained for; each class of claims has the power to veto the debtor-state's restructuring plan.
150 Furthermore, any transfer of value from creditors to their debtor-state would be less under the Model Law than under a typical corporate bankruptcy law, because the latter gives debtors cram-down powers. 
Political Feasibility
This article has already observed several reasons why a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring should be politically more feasible than a convention. Most significantly, a model-law approach would not require general acceptance by the world's nations for its implementation.
152 Only one or two jurisdictions need enact this article's proposed Model Law for it to become widely effective.
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And once that occurs, a debtor-state whose debt contracts are governed by those jurisdictions' laws, or by its own laws, could restructure that debt without needing to amend any of those contracts. 154 Experience also shows that a model law's more relaxed nature, being domestic law, and (for that reason) less formal enactment process and minimal interference with sovereignty can succeed where a formal treaty approach can languish. 155 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. Cf. Setser, supra note 48, at 6 (observing that debtor-states opposed the SDRM because they were "keen to protect their sovereignty, and to prevent an international organization from gaining jurisdiction over their domestic-law debt").
It is also informative to assess the political feasibility of a model-law approach from the perspective of the politics of the IMF's failed SDRM. As mentioned, that approach failed because it was opposed both by Wall Street and by certain emerging market countries that feared it would raise their cost of borrowing.
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Section 6.1 of this article has argued, however, that a model-law approach should reduce those costs.
A model-law approach should also surmount most other reasons suggested to explain the SDRM's failure. At the time the SDRM was proposed, many believed that "[e]xchange offers, combined with the ability to amend a bond's terms [,] provide a mechanism for [sovereign] debt restructuring even in the absence of a [statutory debt restructuring] regime." 157 Experience, of course, has undermined that belief.
158 Also at that time, "the major emerging economies -and particularly the Latin American economies -feared losing access to large scale emergency credit from the IMF in return for legal protection of only marginal value." 159 The new reality is that debtor-states cannot always count on the IMF for that credit, 160 whereas the value of a model law's protection should be significant.
Finally, some may have opposed the SDRM because of " [s] uspicions about the role the IMF would play in a restructuring process designed by the IMF." 161 This appears to explain, for example, the financial industries' opposition. 162 The model-law approach is not designed by the IMF, nor is the IMF necessarily part of its supervisory process. 163 Others have observed that some nations may oppose any international tribunal (even one that is otherwise neutral) interfering with sovereign political discretion. 164 the supervisory process to ministerial actions, 165 the Supervisory Authority managing that process would lack authority to interfere with political discretion.
A model-law approach could also provide clear positive political benefits. By helping to privatize interim funding to a debtor-state, 166 it could reduce the burden on IMF creditor countries of funding IMF bailout loans. 167 Reducing the need for IMF funding would also reduce the conditionality that the IMF, politically, imposes on borrowing nations, which can sometimes exacerbate the nation's economic woes.
168 Furthermore, a model-law approach could provide a political cover for painful decisions that can be attributed by state to a supervising entity or to legal requirements. 169 None of this means that a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring, or at least this article's proposed Model Law, will be politically feasible. For example, some debtor-states might oppose the Model Law's similar treatment 170 of domestic and foreign claims.
171 Some private creditors might also oppose the Model Law's supermajority aggregate voting, believing that the threat of holdouts is necessary to ensure that debtor-states will bargain fairly 172 (but failing to understand that the Model Law preserves that threat to the extent necessary to motivate fair bargaining 173 ). At the very least, however, this article should serve to increase a model-law approach's political feasibility by explaining the approach and its potential benefits and limitations, including its ability to equitably relieve debtor-states from 165 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 166 See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text; see also Model Law Articles 8 and 9. 167 Cf. Setser, supra note 48, at 3 (discussing that many IMF creditor countries favored the SDRM for this same reason). 168 Jayadev and Konczal, supra note 113. Cf. supra note 104 (arguing that the conditionality that would have been imposed under the IMF's SDRM would be politically volatile and might impose harsh conditions on the citizens of the debtor-state). 169 Westbrook, supra note 6, at 256. 170 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 171 Cf. Setser, supra note 48, at 19 (observing that including "domestic debt" claims in the SDRM "was a bridge too far for almost everyone"). 172 Ibid. at 7-8 (and also observing that some creditors believe that the existing contractual restructuring process is already favorable to debtor-states). 173 The Model Law preserves the holdout threat to the extent needed to motivate debtor-states to bargain fairly. See supra note 93. Absent a fair bargain, no creditor class would have an incentive to vote to approve a debt restructuring plan -and each class has the power to veto the debtorstate's restructuring plan. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. The Model Law seeks to eliminate the holdout threat only for rent-seeking holdouts, who use that threat to unreasonably extract value (at least in part) from other similarly situated creditors. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. unsustainable debt burdens. An incremental approach to developing norms has strong precedent in the legal ordering of international relationships, 174 especially "where law reformers possess limited authority and where the subject is either controversial or technical," such as "global insolvency law reform."
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Conclusions
The existing contractual framework for sovereign debt restructuring is sorely inadequate. Whether or not their fault, nations sometimes take on debt burdens that become unsustainable. Until resolved, the resulting sovereign debt problem hurts not only those nations (such as Greece) but also their citizens, their creditors, and -by posing serious systemic risks to the international financial system -the wider economic community. The existing contractual framework functions poorly to resolve the problem because it often leaves little alternative between a sovereign debt bailout, which is costly and creates moral hazard, and a default, which raises the specter of systemic financial contagion. 'l L. 935, 939 (2005) (observing that UNCITRAL's Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency "created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between universalists and territorialists … by appearing to be a hybrid of universalism and territorialism [,] . . . thus allow[ing] hesitant states to 'acclimate' to a regime of universalism"). An incremental approach to developing norms has also been valuable for addressing international environmental problems, such as climate change. See, e.g. Daniel J. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation 221 (2006) (arguing that "an incremental . . . strategy for change offers the best alternative for speeding up the transition to a new environmental regulation"); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 21, 133-134 (2001) (observing that "any solution to current concerns with the U.S. environmental regulatory system is likely to be and is best served by an incremental approach"); Philippa England, Book Reviews, 54 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1037 , 1038 (reviewing Francis Botchway, International Encyclopaedia of Laws, Supplement 46, in International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Environmental Law) ("More sophisticated legal techniques are not necessarily the solution -realistic, feasible solutions driven by the political will of leaders, the general population and supported by the international community may offer a more incremental but ultimately more effective method of dealing with environmental issues"). And recently, an incremental approach to developing norms has succeeded in legalizing gay marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 .
Most observers therefore want to strengthen the legal framework for resolving sovereign debt problems. International organizations, including the United Nations, have been contemplating strengthening that framework through treaties. The political economy of treaty-making, however, makes that type of multilateral approach highly unlikely to succeed in the near future.
This article argues, in contrast, that a model-law approach should not only strengthen that legal framework but also should be politically and economically feasible. Model laws have long been used in cross-border lawmaking, but they are different than treaties. Unlike a treaty, a model law would not require general acceptance for its implementation. Only one or two jurisdictions, for example, need enact the text of this article's proposed model law for it to become widely effective. Once that occurs, a debtor-state whose debt contracts are governed by those jurisdictions' laws, or by its own laws, could restructure that debt without needing to amend any of those contracts.
A model-law approach should also be desirable. This article's model law, for example, would reduce uncertainty and should also achieve significant cost advantages -both to debtor-states and to their creditors -over the sovereigndebt-restructuring status quo. Because it would require only a ministerial supervisory process, the model law would not interfere with the exercise of a sovereign's political discretion. Moreover, the model law provides incentives to motivate fair bargaining on behalf of debtor-states and their creditors, while restricting rentseeking holdouts. It also enables the type of interim funding of day-to-day debts that a debtor-state needs during its debt restructuring.
Debtor-states should therefore want (and creditors, other than rent-seeking holdouts, should want them) to enact into law this article's proposed model-law text. Regardless of whether that enactment occurs, however, the article should serve its underlying purpose: to provide a conceptual and legal analysis of how a model law could be structured and how a model-law approach could be used to solve the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt burdens, and to help develop the norms required to facilitate those goals. purchase price of property or services, other than trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary course of business; monies owing on capitalized lease obligations; monies owing on or with respect to letters of credit, bankers' acceptances, or other extensions of credit; and monies owing on moneymarket instruments or instruments used to finance trade; 3. "Plan" means a debt restructuring plan contemplated by Chapter III; 4. "State" means a sovereign nation; 5. "Supervisory Authority" means [name of neutral international organization].
Chapter II: Invoking the Law's Application
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition 1. A State may invoke application of this Law by filing a voluntary petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority. 2. Such petition shall certify that the State (a) seeks relief under this Law, and has not previously sought relief under this Law (or under any other law that is substantially in the form of this Law) during the past [ten] years, (b) needs relief under this Law to restructure claims that, absent such relief, would constitute unsustainable debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure those claims in accordance with this Law, (d) agrees to all other terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law, and (e) has duly enacted any national law needed to effectuate these agreements. If requested by the Supervisory Authority, such petition shall also attach documents and legal opinions evidencing compliance with clause (e). 3. Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so long as such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority [or this jurisdiction] for lack of good faith, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by the law of another jurisdiction that has enacted law substantially in the form of this Law; and (c) be recognized in, and by, all other jurisdictions that have enacted law substantially in the form of this Law. 
